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* * * * * * *
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment as to the
validity of the laws passed by the Forty-Second Utah State
Legislature and as to the eligibility of teachers for membership
in the Legislature.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was disposed of in· the trial court by summary
judgments brought both by Plaintiff and by Defendants.

From
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that portion of the judgment favorable to Plaintlff, Defendants
appeal.

There is no cross-appeal by Plaintiffs on that part of

the judgment favorable to Defendants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of that part of the trial court's
judgment favorable to Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 10, 1977, Governor Scott !1. Matheson convened
the 1977-1978 Utah State Legislature.

The Legislature had among

its members several teachers or school administrators.

The

Legislature enacted a number of laws during its 1977-1978
session.
On August 9, 1978, Plaintiff brought a declaratory action
in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, seeking to
have declared invalid all laws passed by the 1977-1978 Utah
State Legislature on the basis that the Legislature was improperly
constituted in violation of the Utah State Constitution which
provides that certain persons may not be members of the Legislature.
Pursuant to motions for summary judgment brought by both
Plaintiff and Defendants, the trial court ruled that:
l.

The Court had jurisdiction;

2.

Plaintiff had standing to bring the action;
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3.

Article VI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution pro-

hibits educators and school teachers employed in the utah
Public School System from simultaneously being members of the
Utah Legislature;
4.

The Forty-Second Utah Legislature was properly con-

stituted and seated and was a de facto Legislature;
5.

All laws enacted by the Forty-Second Legislature are

valid and in full force and effect;
6.

All monies collected by the Forty-Second Legislature

should not be returned to the people.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE JUDGE
OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
FOR THE LEGISLATURE
Defendants contend that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to
pass upon the eligibility of candidates for the State Legislature.
They cite as authority for this contention Article VI, Section
10, Utah State Constitution (all cites are to the Utah Constitution unless otherwise indicated), which provides as follows:
Each House shall be the judge of the election
and qualifications of its members, and may
punish them for disorderly conduct, and with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all of the
members elected, expel a member for cause.
Defendants read this constitutional provision as making the
Legislature the sole and exclusive judge of all questions
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affecting membership in the Legislature.

By its very language,

however, this constitutional provision is limited to questions
relative to the election and qualification of the Legislature's
members.

This appeal deals only with the portion of the trial

court's summary judgment which holds that teachers may not be
members of the Legislature.

That portion of the summary judg-

ment appealed from deals with the eligibility of candidates for
the Legislature, and not with actual members of the Legislature.
Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 P.899
dispositive of this appeal.

(1901), is not

In Ellison, the Utah Supreme Court

was asked to decide an election contest arising from alleged
voting irregularities.

The Court declined to decide the election

for the reason that Article VI, Section 10, granted the Legislature exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contests.
Ellison does not deal with the eligibility of candidates for the
Legislature.
Courts of sister states have ruled on the scope of a
Legislature's jurisduction to decide questions of candidacy for
membership in the body.

In State v. Dubuque, 68 Wash. 2d 553,

413 P.2d 972 (1966), the Washington Supreme Court was asked to
construe the effect of a constitutional provision similar to
Article VI, Section 7, prohibiting a legislator from being
elected or appointed to an office created by the Legislature of
which he was a part.

The Washington Legislature had passed laws

increasing the salaries of representatives and new senators
for the upcoming session of the Legislature.

Suit was brought

by a taxpayer-elector to determine whether members of the 39th
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Washington Legislature would be eligible for reelection to the
40th Legislature.

Like Defendants here, the appellants in

Dubuque asserted that the Legislature was the exclusive judge of
the eligibility of its members.

The trial court took the

position that the constitutional provision relating to the inhouse judiciary function of the Legislature did not bar it from
construing another constitutional provision directed at the
eligibility of candidates for the Legislature.

The Supreme

Court affirmed, pointing out that the case before it did not
concern members of the Legislature but rather candidates for
the Legislature.
The Court in Dubuque, supra, appended a footnote to its
opinion, pointing out the folly of vesting a Legislature with
exclusive jurisdiction as to all questions of membership therein:
We apprehend a grave danger to our democratic
institutions if it be the inexorable rule
that, without regard to concepts of fair play
and due process of law, the House and Senate
of either the State Legislature or the
Congress have exclusive jurisdiction to
disqualify and unseat members thereof and
that the courts are completely powerless in
the premises. Conceding the separation of
powers to be one of the keystones of freedom,
we note among other dangers that, should the
courts be deemed utterly without jurisdiction,
one political party can, if ruthlessly bent
upon destruction of its opposition, disqualify
and unseat all of its opposing members.
413
P.2d at 977, n.S.
This Court, like the Washington Court, should not construe
Article VI, Section 10, to divest it of jurisdiction to construe
another constitutional provision relating to the eligibility of
candidates for membership in the Utah Legislature.
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In Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251. 473 P.2d 872

(1970), the

Hawaii Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality
of a statutory provision requiring a candidate to be a resident
three years before seeking election to the House of
tives.

Repr~senta-

The statutory provision tied in with a constitutional

provision regarding eligibility for membership in the State
Legislature.

The petitioner contended that a construction of the

provision by a court would be a usurpation of the exclusive
constitutional right of the State Legislature to pass upon
questions of eligibility of its members.

The court rejected this

idea, basing its holding on Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89
S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969):
The precise question has not been before the
United States Supreme court.
However, we
think there is clear indication in Powell v.
McCormack . . . that if the question is
presented to it, it will rule that the power
of each House to judge the qualifications of
its members does not include the power to
construe the constitutional provision on
qualifications contrary to the construction
of the court.
473 P.2d at 876.
The question before this Court concerns the construction of a
constitutional provision specifically excluding certain persons
from membership in the Legislature.

It would be ludicrous to

suggest that the Legislature may assume a judicial role and
interpret Article VI, Section 6, relating to the eligibility of
candidates to the Legislature.

The Legislature may have ex-

elusive jurisdiction to decide upon the election and qualification of its members once they are members, but that small grant
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of judicial power does not make the Legislature a partner with
the Judiciary in interpreting the Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz.
390, 265 P.2d 447 (1953), was called upon to issue a writ of quo
warranto to oust a person claiming a right to be seated in the
State Senate.

The case arose when an amendment to the Arizona

Constitution provided that there would be two senators from
Apache County.

Prior to the adoption of the amendment, Apache

County only had one senator.

The Governor, thinking that the

adoption of the new amendment created a vacancy in the term of
one of the senators, appointed Defendant Lockhart to serve as
senator from Apache County.

The Supreme court of Arizona decided

that the question was justicable under a quo warranto proceeding
despite the constitutional provision making the Legislature the
judge of elections and qualifications of its members.

The Court

held:
Nor is this exercise of jurisdiction by the
courts an encroachment upon the power of the
Legislature to judge the qualifications of
its own members.
265 P.2d at 450.
In Powell v. McCormack, 395

u.s.

486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23

L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969), the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the trial court and the court of appeals in their
holdings that the Federal Judiciary was without jurisdiction to
decide the propriety of an exclusionary order vacating the House
seat of Representative Adam Clayton Powell.

The Court found

jurisdiction because the questions before the Court involved
construction of constitutional provisions and such an exercise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by the Judiciary would not be a usurpation of the adjudicatory
power reserved to the House of Representatives to determine
qualification of its members.

The Court pointed out:

[A] determination of petitioner Powell's
right to sit would require no more than an
interpretation of the Constitution.
Such a
determination falls within the traditional
role accorded courts to interpret the law,
and does not involve a "lack of the respect
due [a] coordinate [branch] of government'"
nor does it involve an "initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."
395 u.s. at 548.
In the instant matter Defendants seek to convince this Court
that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter
before it.

They contend that Article VI, Section 10, makes the

State Legislature the exclusive judge of its members.

Plaintiff

does not argue that the Legislature may not judge the qualifications or the election returns of members once they are elected.
However, the matter before the Court involves an interpretation
of other constitutional provisions.

It has always been the

prerogative of the judiciary to interpret and construe constitutional provisions.

A grant of limited judicial power to the

Legislature to deal with its own members does not deprive this
Supreme Court of its role as interpreter of the Constitution.
The matter at bar involves eligibility for candidacy to the
Legislature, it deals with the qualifications of a potential
member of the Legislature and not of an actual member.

This

Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues before it.
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POINT II
STATE LEGISLATORS MAY NOT
SIMULTANEOUSLY HOLD TEACHING POSITIONS
IN UTAH PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The court below found that Article VI, Section 6,

(See

Appendix) , would be violated if administrators and teachers
could simultaneously be members of the Utah State Legislature.
Defendants propose that the words "public office," as used
therein, are to be narrowly construed so as not to encompass
teachers employed by the state system of public schools.
There are numerous cases giving a definition of public
officer.

The Supreme Court of Utah has itself on occasion dealt

with the question of what constitutes a public office.

For

example, in Dull v. Mining Company, 28 Utah 467,79 P.lOSO (1905),
this Court denied a court reporter additional compensation for
reporting a lengthy trial.

The Court found that a court reporter

was a public officer and that public officers are entitled only
to compensation as fixed by law, so that any contract for
additional compensation in the performance of official duties
would be void as against public policy.
In a more recent case, the Utah Supreme Court held that
membership on a Legislative Council constituted the holding of
civil office, and that, therefore, a legislator could not hold
such office because of the prohibition of Article VI, Section 6.
Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226 469 P.2d 497 (1970).

It should

be noted that the Legislative Council had been created by the
Utah Legislature and was to consist of sixteen members drawn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from the members of the Legislature itself.

~his

Court con-

strued the word "public office of profit" in a very broad manner
so as to include members of the Legislature itself.

If the

Court was willing to construe "public office" in a manner which
would eliminate in-house membership, how much more then should
the Court be willing to hold that the commingling of the role of
a LegiElator with that of a member of another branch of the
government is unhealthy.
The Territorial Supreme Court in McCornick v. Thatcher, 8
Utah 294, 30 P.l091 (1892), discussed various definitions of
public officer found in the authorities.

The Court cited this

broad definition from State v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 59:

A "public office" is an agency for the state,
and the person whose duty it is to perform
this agency is a "public officer." This we
consider to be the true definition of a
"public officer" in its original broad sense.
The essense of it is the duty of performing
an agency; that is, of doing some act or
acts, or series of acts, for the state.
8
Utah at 301, 30 P. at 1093.
In McCornick, the Court was called upon to decide whether
trustees of the Territorial College could be considered public
officers.

The Court held that they were such.

Case law abounds with discussions of the meaning of the
words "public officer."

In 1892 the Supreme Court of Utah

noted:
The definitions of the term "office," as given
by the text writers and courts, are not in
entire harmony. .
HcCornick v. Thatcher,
8 Utah at 301, 30 P. at 1093.
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Almost a century later it can be said that the muddied waters of
semantics have not cleared.

There is still no harmony in the

definitions of "public officer."
Members of school boards and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction are officers.

In 53-l-ll, Utah Code Ann., the State

Superintendent of Public Instruction is referred to as "the chief
state school officer."

That members of the State Board of

Education hold a public office is demonstrated by the elaborate
election procedure specified in 53-2-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann.
So prominent a public office is membership on the State Board of
Education that the candidates' names appear on the same ballots
with candidates for the United States Senate and the Utah Senate.
The Superintendent of Public Instruction is identified as
the "executive officer of the board [of education]," in 53-2-1,
Utah Code Ann.

Section 5 of that Chapter provides that "the

State Superintendent shall present to the Governor a report of
the Administration of the System of Public Instruction."

There

is a further requirement in 53-3-9, Utah Code Ann., that the
Superintendant shall file monthly itemized expense account
statements to the State Board of Examiners.

The State Board of

Examiners consists of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and
the Attorney General under 63-6-1, Utah Code Ann.

All of these

statutory provisions locate the entire Public School System and
its members within the executive branch of the state government.
Members of County Boards of Education are also officers,
53-6-3, Utah Code Ann., and are clearly part of the executive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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branch of government in that they report to the State Superintendent, 53-6-13, Utah Code Ann., who, as pointed out above,
reports to the State Board of Examiners.
The final link in the chain of command from teachers to the
Governor is provided in the "Educational Professional Practices
Act", 53-50-l, et seq., Utah Code Ann.

That chapter provides

that the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall appoint
members to a professional practices commission.

These members

come from "professional personnel" within the educational system
and "classroom teachers."

The commission serves as a regulatory

agency within the teaching profession itself.
It is clear that, whether the term "officer'' is used or not,
Utah statutes place the educational system squarely within the
executive branch of government.
meaning of "public office."

This case should not turn on the

For this Court to lose sight of the

underlying issue at bar by sinking in the quagmire of the semantics of "public office" would be to ignore the underpinnings of
the constitutional provisions in question here.

Constitutional

provisions such as Article VI, Section 6, and Section 7, were
designed as specific implementations of a more general constitutional prohibition contained in Article V, Section 1.

That

provision is the traditional statement of the doctrine of Separation of Powers.

It provides:

The powers of the government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, the executive,
and the judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
If Article VI, Section 6, does not prevent teachers from being
members of the Legislature, it is very clear that the prohibition
of Article V, Section 1, will prevent Legislators from being
teachers.

The issue in this case is Separation of Powers.

In State v. Grover, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807 (1942), this
Court had the occasion to deal with a case arising under Article
VI, Section 7.

The Court did an exhaustive study of constitu-

tions of sister states with respect to the prohibition against a
legislator's accepting an office created during the term of his
membership in the Legislature.

The Court lauded decisions from

other jurisdictions which discussed the evil arising from
trafficking in public offices.

The Court also noted that many

state constitutions prohibits legislators from having any other
type of office or employment.

The Court made these observations:

In the study of the various state constitutions it is interesting to note that the newer
or more recently adopted constitutions, and
practically all constitutions that have been
amended on this point since originally adopted,
have made the inhibition against legislators
receiving or accepting appointive office more
rigid, to bar them from any office, even
though not created by a Legislature of which
they were members.
In california in 1916 the
people by initiative petition enacted an
amendment to their constitution, Article IV,
Section 19, barring legislators from holding
or accepting any office, trust or employment
under the State during the term for which they
were elected to the Legislature.
102 Utah at 48,
125 P.2d at 810.
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The cited opinion shows the keen interest that the Utah Supreme
Court has demonstrated in the past in keeping the three branches
of government separate and in assuring that legislators enjoy
"that independent frame of mind which should be possessed by the
ideal legislator."

102 Utah at 51, 125 P.2d at 812, quoting from

Chenoweth v. Chambers, 164 P.428 (Cal. 1917).
There is no question that the Utah Public School System
benefits from appropriations made by the Utah State Legislature.
An educator within the Utah State School System would naturally
be happy to see his profession advanced by healthy appropriations.
A teacher-legislator may at times not enjoy that free state of
mind with regard to legislative determinations which the Utah
Supreme Court found to be so important in Grover, supra.
Other states have dealt directly with the question of teachers
in the legislature.

The Alaska Supreme Court examined the question

in Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968).

The wording of

the Alaska Constitution was broader than the equivalent Utah
provision.

The Alaska Constitution, Article II, Section 5, pro-

vides, in pertinent part:
No legislator may hold any other office or
position of profit under the United States or
the State.
The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the Separation of Powers
doctrine mandates a conclusion that teachers hold a position of
profit under the state, and that, therefore, to allow them to
sit in the Alaska Legislature would violate the Alaska Constitution.

The Court expounded on the reasoning underlying the

Separation of Powers doctrine:
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Alaska's constitutional prohibition against
members of our three separate branches of
state government holding any other position
of profit under the State of Alaska reflects
the intent to guard against conflicts of
interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration
of power, and dilution of separation of
powers in regard to the exercise by these
government officials of the executive, judicial and legislative functions of our state
government. The rationale underlying such
prohibitions can be attributed to the desire
to encourage and preserve independence and
integrity of action, and decision on the part
of individual members of our state government.
441 P.2d at 35.
Like the Alaska Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court demonstrated in Grover, supra, that it is concerned about the dilution
of the separation of powers and its attendant evils.
The Oregon Supreme Court was faced with the question of
teachers in the Legislature in Monaghan v. School District No. 1,
Clackamas County, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957).

In that

case the Oregon Supreme Court held that a legislator duly elected
was prohibited from exercising his functions as a school teacher
in a public school district by a constitutional prohibition
worded almost exactly like the Utah provision found in Article

v,

Section 1.

The opinion in Monaghan is very well reasoned.

The Court refused to find that the words "any functions" were
synonomous with official duties and pointed out:
One who performs "official duties" necessarily functions in tasks relating to his
office, but one who exercises the functions
of another department is not necessarily
engaged in the performance of "official
duties."
315 P.2d at 803.
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The Oregon Court found that Representative Monaghan was charged
with the exercise of powers belonging to a senator, but that he
also performed "functions" belonging to another department of
government, the executive branch.

The Court reasoned that

education was not a local matter, since the Oregon Constitution
mandated the establishment of a statewide school system.

It also

found that school districts were quasi-municipal corporations and
a governmental agency which performed duties imposed on it by
statute.

The Court then reasoned that teachers were employees of

this state agency.
The Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 1, also mandates
establishment of a public school system:
The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a uniform system
of public schools, which shall be open to all
children of the state, and be free from
sectarian control.
The Utah Supreme Court has declared educational divisior.s to be
bodies corporate.

In Hansen v. Board of Education of Emery

county School District, 101 Utah 15, 116 P.2d 936 (1941), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
A Board of Education is a legal entity created
by statute. For the purpose of administering
the affairs relating to schools within a
designated area, certain limited powers are
conferred upon boards of education.
These
powers are exercised for the welfare and in
the interest of the people within the designated area.
101 Utah at 21, 116 P.2d at 938.
Lest there be any misunderstanding as to the importance of the
role of the actual teacher within the framework of the state
education system and its relation to the executive branch of
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government, the Oregon Supreme Court in !1onaghan, supra, pointed
out that a teacher surely occupied a more important place in
state government than stenographers.
Or. 589, 137 P.864

It cited Gibson v. Kay, 68

(1914), wherein the Oregon Supreme Court had

earlier found that stenographers and clerks of the corporation
commissioner were prohibited under the Separation of Powers
clause in the Oregon Constitution from holding office in other
departments of government.

It will be remembered that the

Supreme Court of Utah has also declared stenographers to be
public officers.
(1905).

Dull v. Mining Company, 28 Utah 67, 30 P.l091

How much more important the public school teacher is in

the framework of the Utah State Government than a court reporter.
~he

Oregon Supreme Court in Monaghan, supra, would not

impute a malevolent motive to Representative Monaghan, but merely
pointed out that the occasion for abuse must be avoided under the
Separation of Powers doctrine.

The Court found the lower court's

assessment of the situation admirably stated and incorporated it
into the opinion:
Conceivably the school board could say to
its employee who is serving in the legislature, "You must vote in favor of certain
bills that are advantageous to us and which
increase our authority.
If you do, we will
increase your salary, and if you do not you
will be penalized in your position in certain respects." Would this relationship not
then tend to concentrate power in the branch
of the government by which the member of the
legislature was employed and to the detriment
of the legislative branch? 315 P.2d at 805.
The same potential for abuse exists in the Utah State Legislature.
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Respondent in the case at bar does not impute evil motive to
educators who desire to be members of the Legislature.

Civic

interest is always to be praised wherever it can be found.

But

the Separation of Powers doctrine is a keystone of democratic
government as practiced in the United States and to allow a person to commingle his role in one branch with functions and duties
of another branch would lead to an unholy marriage, anathema in
the eyes of American governmental tradition.

Teachers should not

be legislators and legislators should not be teachers.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING
TO BRING THIS ACTION
Where a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a
statute the question of standing may arise.

Several Utah cases

have held that "an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be
made by one whose interests have not been and are not about to be
prejudiced by its operation."

State v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376,

49 P.2d 408 (1935).
There is no hard and fast rule, however, as to what constitutes standing.

This is especially true where a plaintiff

seeks interpretation of a constitutional provision without
reference to a statute.

In such cases the only requirement for

standing may be that the plaintiff be a taxpayer.

For example,

in Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831
(1966), the court entertained an action for a declaratory judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment with regard to tax laws promulgated by the state legislature.

In a footnote to the opinion the court made reference to

the usual rule that "one must himself suffer damage or have his
rights adversely affected before he can question the constitutionality of the statute."
n. 7.

17 Utah 2d at 342, 411 P.2d at 834,

In the same footnote, however, the court admitted that in

this case it had "met and dealt with the issue here presented."
Given the gravity of the issue, the court felt that justice would
best be served by meeting the issues head on rather than evading
them by holding that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring
the suit.
The California Supreme Court has recently ruled that the
requirement of standing is met when the court is assured that the
plaintiff before it will vigorously prosecute the issues raised.
In Harmon v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496
P.2d 1248 (1972), the court ruled that a taxpayer had standing to
seek a declaratory judgment on a complaint that the City Director
of Property was selling city property at prices not reflecting
their true value.

The defendant city claimed that the plaintiff

did not have standing to bring such a suit.

The court held:

A party enjoys standing to bring his complaint into court if his stake in the resolution of that complaint assumes the proportions
necessary to insure that he will vigorously
present his case.
496 P.2d at 1254.
The court analyzed the plaintiff's interest and found that, if
the City could sell property for a higher price, then the municipal
taxes would be decreased, as would plaintiff's tax burden.

This
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gave the plaintiff sufficient interest in the case to insure
vigorous prosecution.
Plaintiff in the instant matter is a taxpayer and an elector.
As a taxpayer he suffers the burden of increased taxation if the
legislature, improperly constituted, makes unnecessary and overly
large appropriations to public education in the state.

As an

elector the power of his vote is diminished when other electors
are allowed to vote for candidates not eligible to sit in the
legislature.

The very fact that Plaintiff is before this Court

demonstrates his zeal in prosecuting the suit.
The United States Supreme Court has also often relaxed the
standing requirements when the issues presented were worthy of
the Court's attention.

In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 S,

Ct. 397, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932), the court granted a writ of
certiorari and reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in a redistricting case filed by a "citizen, elector
and taxpayer."

285 U.S. at 361.

Likewise, where all other

interested parties to a suit cannot effectively be brought
before the court, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
representative plaintiff may bring the suit.

In NAACP v. Alabama,

357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958), the Supreme
Court allowed the NAACP to assert the rights of individual Negro
members.

The Court noted the general rule as to standing and

explained its exception in this case:
To limit the breadth of issues which must be
dealt with in particular litigation, this
court has generally insisted that parties
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rely only on constitutional rig~ts which are
personal to thenselves. .
The principle
is not disrespected where constitutional
rights of persons who are not immediately
before the court could not be effectively
vindicated except through an appropriate
representative before the court.
357 U.S.
at 459.
In the case at bar the interests of plaintiff in prosecuting this
action are representative of those of other citizens of Utah who
are interested in the proper constitution of the Utah Senate.
Perhaps the most cogent explanation of a court's approach to
standing where crucial issues are involved was expressed in
State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P,2d 975
(1974).

There plaintiff brought an original proceeding in the

New !1exico Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering certain
state officials to ignore "line item vetoes" made by the Governor.

The court granted the writ of mandamus despite a challenge

to plaintiff's standing.

The court noted that the question of

standing could not be determined by hard and fast rules.

The

court recognized plaintiff's standing not by virtue of plaintiff's civil status, but by virtue of the importance of the
issues before the court.

The court stated:

[I]t has been clearly and firmly established
that even though a private party may not have
standing to invoke the power of this court to
resolve constitutional questions and enforce
constitutional compliance, this court, in its
discretion, may grant standing to private
parties to vindicate the public interest in
cases presenting issues of great public
importance. There is no claim that the
issues here presented are not of great public
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interest cr importance, and we consider them
of sufficiently great importance and interest
to the public to grant standing to petitioner
to raise and present them in these proceedings.
524 P.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
The issues now before this Court present grave questions of
public importance.

This Court may wish to recognize plaintiff's

standing to raise these issues on the ground that plaintiff is a
taxpayer and an elector.

Or this Court may simply exercise its

discretion and grant the plaintiff standing in order to rule on
important matters.

In either case the question of standing

should not be allowed to interfere with the Court's adjudication
of the constitutional questions before it.

CONCLUSION

The issue before this Court involves the Separation of
Powers doctrine.

The case turns on the interpretation of pro-

visions in the Utah Constitution.

The Utah Constitution, Article

VI, Section 10, carves a small slice of judicial power and gives
it to the legislative branch of government so that it can judge
the qualifications of its own members.

Other constitutional

provisions such as those in question here, Article VI, Section 6,
and Article V, Section l, deal with eligibility for candidacy to
the legislature.

Interpretation of constitutional provisions is

uniquely the function of the Judiciary.

This Court has juris-

diction to decide the issues before it.
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The Utah Educational System and its member-employees are
inextricably involved in the executive branch of the Utah state
government.

The Utah State Constitution, Article VI, Section 6,

and Article V, Section 1, are designed to assure the separation
of powers so that each branch of government may remain untainted
by intrusions from other branches.

To allow teachers to sit in

the Legislature commingles the functions of two distinct branches
of the state government and violates the Utah Constitution.
As taxpayer and elector, the plaintiff has standing to seek
a judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions.

The

issue before the court is of such magnitude that standing may be
accorded plaintiff as a matter of law or as a matter of discretion by this Court.
Plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, therefore prays this Court to
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of September, 1978.
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JAMES B. LEE

AMES MELEGE

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
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APPENDIX

ARTICLE V, SECTION 1:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the
cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 6:
No person holding any public office o f profit or trust
under authority of the United States, or of this State,
shall be a member of the Legislature; Provided, That
appointments in the State Militia, and the offices of
notary public, justice of the peace, United States
commissioner, and postmaster of the fourth class, shall
not, within the meaning of this section, be considered
offices of profit or trust.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7:
No member of the Legislature, during the term for which
he was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any
civil office of profit under this State, which shall
have been created, or the emoluments of which shall
have been increased, during the term for which he was
elected.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 10:
Each house shall be the judge of the election and
qualifications of its members, and may punish them for
disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of twothirds of all of the members elected, expel a member
for cause.
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